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ABSTRACT. Although many security solutions exist, home computer systems 
are vulnerable against different type of attacks. The main reason is that users 
are either not motivated to use these solutions or not able to correctly use them. 
In order to make security software more usable and hence computers more se-
cure, we re-ran the study by Wash about “Folk Models of Home Computer Se-
curity” in Germany. We classified the different mental models in eleven folk 
models. Eight of the identified folk models are similar to the models Wash pre-
sented. We describe each folk model and illustrate how users think about com-
puter security.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the beginning of the computer era, computers were used by experts only and they 
were not connected to a worldwide network. Those experts were familiar with the use 
of the systems, knew the pitfalls, and knew how to protect their computers. Nowa-
days, computers and other devices, such as smartphones, are widely spread in Germa-
ny and nearly each and every household has a home computer. In contrast to the be-
ginning, most users are not trained with the systems and have an incomplete mental 
model and knowledge of computer and Internet security many studies like [5, 6, 7, 8] 
show in different contexts. Correspondingly home computers are vulnerable against 
many different attacks with many different consequences, often although security 
software is used. Typical attacks against home computers are: malware infections 
while the consequence can be that users cannot access their data anymore or the com-
puter is used as bot node in a botnet. The problem with security solutions is that they 
are often not usable and thus not able to protect users effectively e.g. because users 
configure the security solution in insecure way [2]. In addition, there is often a small 
timeframe after a new attack has been deployed and the security solution being up-
dated. Such attacks can only be detected and fraud can only be prevented if users 
become more aware, too.  This awareness can either be communicated by the security 
solution or by independent trainings or information, e.g. on TV. However, both the 
more usable security solution as well as the awareness communication can only be 
successful if it takes the user’s mental model and knowledge into account. Therefore, 
it is essential to understand users’ mental models and group them in so called folk 
models, while folk models are mental models that are shared among several members 
of a culture [8].  
In a first study Rick Wash investigated in a qualitative study the folk models on home 
computer security of North American home computer users living on the west coast. 
It can be expected that those model differ between cultures and therefore, this paper 
shows a re-run of the study in Germany and a comparison of the results. First, a short 
introduction to mental models in the context of Internet and Computer security is 
provided (section 2), followed by the description of the study methodology (section 
3). In section 4 the results of our study are presented and compared to the results of 
the original study. The paper closes in section 5 with a discussion of the results. 
2 Mental Models in Security 
The idea to use folk models or mental models for a better understanding of user beha-
vior in the security area is not new. Asgharpour and colleagues [1] used a closed card 
sorting to correlate security risks with mental models. For their approach they chose 
five existing mental models (e.g. physical safety, criminal behavior; cf. [3]) and in-
structed experts and non-experts to sort the security risks to the fitting mental model. 
The main finding of their work was the fact that experts and non-experts differ signif-
icantly in terms of their mental models. Therefore, the authors concluded that security 
advice should be adapted to the mental models of non-experts. Within their study they 
used predefined models, so that between 30% (non-experts) and 40% (experts) of the 
security terms were not categorized into the existing mental models. This is a clear 
hint that users do have additional/different mental models, which have to be identi-
fied.  
One step towards the identification of occurring mental models for security was 
done by Rick Wash [8]. In his study about home computer security Wash [8] talks 
about folk models. In this context folk models are “[..]mental models that are not 
necessarily accurate in the real world, thus leading to erroneous decision making, but 
are shared among similar members of a culture”[8]. So it can be expected that if secu-
rity software were designed to fit to folk models about possible threats, this software 
may have a decreased rate of unexpected behaviors for users. The study of Wash was 
conducted in America with 33 participants from a mixed citizenship. Overall, he in-
dentified eight folk models that exist within the context of home computer security. 
Until now, no intercultural comparison was conducted to see if those folk models 
identified by Wash may be generalized. Within this paper the study of Wash was re-
run in Germany and the results of both studies are compared. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
Aim of this study was a comparison to the original study of Wash [9] and thereby to 
re-run the study of Wash as similarly as possible. The interviews were conducted 
face-to-face or via Skype in two rounds that followed each other with about four 
weeks break in between. Within this break, the interview data of the first round was 
analyzed and scenarios were deduced that focused on critical results from round one. 
It was tried to interview as different people as possible (e.g. level of education, age, 
security knowledge, social background) in order to reach a wide degree of variation in 
the folk models. 
In round one 17 people participated and in round two 9 people participated in the 
interviews. About 25% of the participants were female. They were aged between 18 
and 60 years. As in the original study, those participants represent a part of the Ger-
man population but are by no means representative.  
The first interview round focused on all kinds of general home computer security 
risks. Participants were first asked about their security behavior in general (use of 
passwords, updating software, using security software), followed by questions about 
their knowledge about security threats (known threats, countermeasures, source of 
security problem) and ended with questions about specific security threats (viruses, 
trojans, etc.). Each interview took about 90 minutes. Based on the results of the first 
round, a second interview was developed which included three different scenarios 
about general and current home computer security risks that were derived from criti-
cal aspects and misunderstanding in interview round one. Those scenarios were:  
1) A friend tries to log on into Facebook on their computer and recognizes mali-
cious software on their PC.  
2) They became a victim of a hacker attack.  
3) The police notified them about a theft of their identity.  
For all three scenarios, participants were asked what they would do, if they believe 
the scenarios can be true and why they were a targeted. Additionally, the questions 
about specific threats from interview round one were asked. Each interview took 
about 90 minutes.  
For data analysis two matrices were built that categorized the answers of the partic-
ipants given in the interviews and summarized them into groups. Then, two matrices 
were created extracting the mental models from the interview results and describing 
them shortly to get an impression about each mental model. To avoid subjective no-
tions, statements were not categorized as correct or false. It is believed that mental 
models are simplified representations of the environment that are helpful for the per-
son who holds them and it is seldom the case that a mental model is either correct nor 
false, but often partially both. In a final step, the results of this study were compared 
to the results of the original study. Note, pseudonyms are used in this paper. 
4 RESULTS: FOLK MODELS OF SECURITY THREATS 
Folk models were categorized into models about Models of Viruses, Malware, Spy-
ware and other malicious types of software and models of hackers and break-ins. 
Models were categorized as dealing with malicious types of software if the core of the 
model was about the functionality of the software. By contrast, models were catego-
rized as dealing with hackers and break-ins if the core of the model was concerned 
with the person of the attacker. Each of the presented models was described by at 
least two participants and each of the participants had more than one folk model. 
Overall, 5 different models of viruses were found whereas 6 models for hackers and 
break-ins were identified. The next sections will present models of viruses.  
4.1 Models of Viruses and other Malware 
Security threats within this group are all associated with the term “virus”, but not all 
of the participants thought a virus is concrete software. However, they described it at 
least as a generic term of all kinds of software related to home computer risks like 
trojans, spyware, computer worms, and malware. Almost every participant mentioned 
at least two different folk models of home computer security, but not everyone knew 
how they work in detail and what they could do to decrease the potential threats. In 
general only a few had a lack of security consciousness, while the rest, who named 
more than one model, had been informed by media or more experienced friends. A 
majority knew what countermeasures they can use to be more secure.  
Viruses are Generically ‘Bad’. The first model of viruses is based upon users’ opi-
nion that viruses are bad in general. The respondents described them as negative or 
annoying effects on their computers. All participants with this model were not sure 
how they can be infected by viruses, but mostly believed they could only catch a virus 
by visiting malicious or suspect websites or getting infected by physical media like 
USB flash drives. In all cases users agreed they have to actively download or execute 
the virus. For example Uma said “viruses come from dubious websites or links at 
Facebook”, believing that if she does not click them, she does not get infected. In 
Olivia’s opinion she can catch a virus by opening files on “infected USB flash drives” 
or “malicious attachments from spam emails”. Users of this model are not in great 
fear of getting viruses with regard to their own behavior, but unlike the original study 
they all use anti-virus-software even if they never had a virus before because it makes 
them feel more comfortable. Paula and Julia have both had a virus (trojans), but did 
not know what the virus did or where it came from. They got informed by their anti-
virus software which removed the Trojan automatically. 
Viruses are Buggy Software. A very common folk model is “viruses behave like 
buggy software”. They often lead to computer reboots, corrupted files or total system 
crashes and always slow down the computer. Users can only fix them by re-installing 
their operating system. Respondents of this model usually believe those viruses do not 
have a special purpose and are just meant to annoy. Similar to the “viruses are generi-
cally bad” model, people thought to “catch” a virus they need to actively download or 
“click” a virus. Therefore, users feel mostly immune if they are careful and watch out 
in what kind of files they trust. Some participants said that viruses are often part of 
games or related things. For example, Xander, told us he can ”catch viruses as part of 
game cracks, but thought they are not as bad as ”normal” viruses so he will not stop 
downloading those programs. People who think viruses as some kind of “buggy soft-
ware” are not sure about the purpose they have. Again, they all use anti-virus software 
and sometimes firewalls, because it makes them feel more comfortable. 
Viruses Cause Mischief. The most frequent model is “viruses causing mischief”. 
These mischief activities have a very wide spectrum of how they affect computers and 
what their intentions are. Some of the respondents named unusual pop-ups with ad-
vertisements (Fiona and Neil) or massive data loss (almost everyone) as visible ef-
fects of the infection. Participants corresponding to this model have a better under-
standing of what viruses do and often have concrete images of who could have 
created them. Quinn mentioned an interesting aspect: “viruses can cause damage to 
the computer’s hardware”, so he has to buy new parts like a new hard drive. To get 
mischievous viruses, it is not necessary to actively download and execute them. Users 
can also get them passively by “visiting suspect websites like pornographic sites” 
(Lewis) or “sites with manipulated scripts” (Walter). Respondents with this folk mod-
el use security software, but do not totally rely on it, because “anti-virus tools do not 
know every virus ” (Gerrit). 
Viruses Support Crime. Some of the respondents had the idea that viruses are part of 
criminal intents supporting organized criminals. The main goals of those viruses are 
identity theft, collecting personal data, opening backdoors for hackers and also extor-
tionate robbery. Frequently this is combined with spyware like keyloggers to send the 
attackers passwords and other login information (Matt, Arthur). The model is directly 
connected to the models of hackers as professionals of criminal organizations. Most 
of the participants are worried about becoming victim of monetary robbery, but still 
Online-Banking is seen as very beneficial. Bob believed viruses often “take over 
[..]online banking or other financial accounts and automatically transfer money to 
criminals”. Also if they got robbed by viruses most of them thought it would be their 
own fault and not the fault of Online-Banking in general (Xander, Walter). Partici-
pants in this group have a distinct sense of privacy and are afraid of someone stealing 
and abusing their identity. This abuse was defined in multiple ways: a lot of the atten-
dees only think about collected addresses, names and various personal data (e.g. 
Xander), while others also believe Online-Banking accounts are real parts of their 
identity(Robert). A last aspect of identity theft is creating digital movement profiles 
which do not directly harm them, but lead to more individual advertisements on web-
sites or, combined with collected/stolen addresses, to more precise spam. Thomas 
came up with viruses which can “encrypt important files” on computers, which can 
only be decrypted if you send the authors of the viruses money (”extortion”). Neil had 
the idea that some viruses were directly created by anti-virus software producers to 
convince more people to buy their security software.  
Viruses are Governmental software. A completely new aspect which did not occur 
in the original study, were viruses created by governments or secret services. These 
types of viruses “will be installed on your computer by policemen at house searches” 
(Robert) or “secretly placed by police hackers” (Bob). Those viruses are not easily 
categorized as good or bad. David had the opinion only criminals such as terrorists 
will be a target to find potential risks for mankind or illegal activities. Steven thought 
that governmental viruses are looking for people who are tax dodging, while Robert 
believed those viruses could target every citizen to observe them. As an example for 
this extreme point of view, he referred to the “Bundestrojaner” and “Staatstrojaner” 
(engl. Federal Trojan horse), which are tools from German police to possibly monitor 
everyone, even if they have not done any criminal activity at all. A different threat 
Robert had in mind when thinking of the “Staatstrojaner” was its abuse by criminals 
due to badly written software. He stated it would be possible to take over or put mi-
schievous files to computers.  
4.2 Models of Hackers and Break-ins 
The second important category of folk models deals with “Hackers and Break-ins”. 
All participants had an – more or less concrete - idea of what a hacker is and what he 
does. A hacker can be any kind of person who can somehow get access to a system to 
which no access permission is granted. It is often not obvious which person it exactly 
is or what things he does in order to break into a computer system. In any case, hack-
ers are considered to be persons who break into a system and do something. Most of 
the participants thought about several types of hackers. For some of them it was really 
difficult to clearly separate different hacker models, because they often did not exact-
ly know how hackers operate and where they come from. Even though most of the 
participants had no idea how a hacker can break into a system, they all believed it is 
possible. In their opinion, after a hacker has gained access to their computer, he can 
do whatever the users could do with their computer. Within this study six folk models 
for hackers were found. They describe who is believed to be the attacker, what his 
motivation could be and how they chose their targets.  
 
Hackers practice their hobby. One group of participants considered hackers to 
mainly be young technical “nerds” (i.e. Victor) and often “hobby hackers”(i.e. Ke-
vin). When asked about the meaning of “nerds” participants described them as per-
sons with a very good knowledge of computers and an addiction to them. The term 
“very good knowledge” was very generic but implied whatever it needs to break into 
a computer. Furthermore, they are very talented and intelligent (Olivia, Julia) and may 
be isolated, only having “little social competence” (Victor). Therefore they operate 
alone or only in small groups with only one or two other people. A “Hobby hacker” 
can be a “nerd” as well as a normal person who was not clearly specified. Some of the 
respondents believed that hackers break into systems in order to impress others, which 
was interpreted as a sign of their social incompetence. Some hackers (hobby hackers) 
were described to only break into systems “just for fun”. Many participants also stated 
that hackers want to test their own skills and consider their break-in as a challenge. 
Olivia said “they hack into the school computer to delete or change grades”. The ef-
fects of hackers’ break-ins can cause annoying computer behavior or theft of personal 
data. Claus believed hackers always do damage and told us that damage does not 
implicitly mean ”physical” damage, but rather theft of personal information. Stealing 
of personal files like photos is considered a threat which “happens in the back-
ground”(Paula) and is thereby hard to detect. In Steven’s and Claus’s case they had a 
look at their router logs and noticed that something undefined has gained access from 
the Internet. Often, victims do not know they are actually targeted, meaning they only 
discover any harm caused afterwards. Thus it is very important to prevent a break-in. 
In this model, hackers choose their victims by accident or people they personally 
know. Participants claim “it is very unlikely to become a target if the hacker doesn’t 
know me”. Most of them do not know how to protect themselves from hackers, be-
cause they do not know how a break-in works. 
Hackers are Intruders Who Break into Computers for Criminal Purposes. 
Another set of respondents believed hackers are criminal professionals that operate 
solo as well as in groups. They can be persons of all ages. Robert described them as 
“men from the 70s with long hair”, whereas Ilias imagined “younger persons”. Often 
a hacker was considered to be a male person. Some participants even believed that 
hackers come from a specific region. For example, Xander thought hackers are Asian 
or East-European people, whereas Neil believed they come from Russia. The hackers 
in this model are clearly criminal and very skilled. They are specialized persons with 
extensive computer knowledge. Break-ins are always conducted for criminal purpos-
es, for that reason some participants stated “hackers operate solo so they don’t attract 
attention” (Olivia, Fiona). These hackers often create software which can help them to 
gain access or is placed on the compromised computer. Some attendees reckoned that 
hackers develop and distribute their own viruses and afterwards break into the in-
fected systems. Attacked persons are always victims of a crime. These crimes are 
mostly personal information theft and sometimes system damage. Personal informa-
tion theft is always associated with stealing of sensitive information (mainly banking 
information like credit card or online banking account) which the hacker uses to come 
into money. Identity theft is also possible. Kevin said “hackers steal personal informa-
tion to buy something online with someone else’s identity”. Few participants believed 
that hackers intentionally cause system harm. They break into the computers and in-
tentionally delete files or cause the systems to crash. Even though it is not clear why 
the hackers do this, some participants thought it to be likely. Users with this folk 
model consider everyone to be a potential victim. Nonetheless they think it is very 
unlikely they could be a target because they do not think they have valuable informa-
tion on their PC (Fiona). About half of the participants did not know what to do if 
they become a victim. The only thing they would do while they are under attack was 
to disconnect from the Internet or to shut down their computers. 
Hackers are Professionals of Criminal Organizations. This model is conceptually 
similar to “Hackers are intruders” and is also about hackers who steal users’ personal 
information or intentionally harm computers. The difference lies in the way the hack-
ers select their victims. Within this model, hackers are part of criminal organizations. 
They operate in organized groups with hierarchical structures. Four respondents 
called one of these organizations “the Internet Mafia”(Neil, Fiona, Lewis, Quinn). 
They had never heard whether an “Internet Mafia” exists, thus it is more their imagi-
nation of a structured criminal institution. Such criminal organizations consist of pro-
fessional hackers and other criminal persons without computer knowledge. The “pro-
fessionals” select their victims according to their expected value. ”Stealing precious 
company secrets” was said by Lewis. Julia also believed they focus on “industrial 
spying or sabotage”. But also “rich people with a lot of money” (Robert and Lewis) 
might be targets of those hackers. Additionally, groups of individuals who perfectly 
fit the criminal intentions, like: “building a network [botnets] for spam mails with 
home computers” (Kevin) might be attacked. Another reason given by Olivia was to 
“cripple public authorities”. Subjects describing this folk model did not worry about 
these hackers because they did not consider themselves as worthy target and therefore 
did not aim to protect themselves. 
Hackers are Contractors Who Support Criminals. In this folk model hackers are 
contractors supporting criminals. They aim not at harming others but to make profit 
by selling stolen information or are engaged by criminal groups. While some of our 
participants thought “hackers are absolute computer-freaks acting solo”(Julia), some 
others perceived “hackers are small groups operating for big companies” (Neil). It is 
not distinct who they are exactly, but at least a combination of hobby hackers and 
intruders. The main reason why these hackers break into systems is to collect big 
amounts of personal and financial information which they resell to spammers or other 
criminal organizations. Zelda, for example, described the hack of the “Playstation 
Network” as a hack by a small group gathering credit-card information for some mas-
terminds behind. Participants with this model mostly did not think they are directly a 
target, rather having an account on a big website which gets hacked (Lewis, Yvonne). 
For example contractors attack e-commerce companies like Amazon and eBay or 
financial institutions like PayPal or Online-Banking in general. Those who thought 
they could be a victim also believed they were only randomly selected (Eve, Paula). 
Hence the majority of the users are very careful about the private data they publish to 
online services, and use different passwords for each website to minimize the risk for 
more services to get compromised. 
Hackers are Governmental Officials. An additional folk model was the model 
“hackers engaged by governments and secret services”. It is directly associated with 
the “viruses are governmental software” folk model. People with this mental model 
are often more deeply interested in computer security and politics. Due to the rising 
attention by reading about it in the news, also “normal” computer users are into this 
topic. Almost all of them had a raised concern about hacker groups working for their 
own government ”to observe citizens” (Steven) and also supposed to defend against 
”cyber-war” (Robert) and online-terrorism(David), while Xander and Bob believed 
that governmental hackers also were the attacking party. In summary, all participants 
said that they only act if any type of suspicion of crime is going on. When asked 
about the term ”government hackers”, the majority responded they do not imagine 
very skilled hackers, but rather normal policemen with some kind of additional train-
ing in computer security and hacking. If people are concerned that they could be ob-
served by their government, police or secret services, they only thought these hackers 
would create profiles and collect personal data. Neil had the idea that they could also 
hack into smartphones to produce movement profiles. 
Hackers are Stakeholders with individual and opportunistic purposes. The last 
hacker folk model was hackers with opportunistic goals and targets. Those hackers 
are driven by their individual view on how the world should be, but may not be dis-
tinctly legal in all cases. Arthur and Kevin for example referred to ”Anonymous” and 
”LulzSec” as stakeholders with arguable aims, but agreed they often operate in grey 
areas of law which may not be reasonable for everyone, ”especially for governments”. 
Another group of stakeholders named by Eve and Walter is the German lobby associ-
ation “Chaos Computer Club” (abbr. “CCC”). This organized collective of hackers 
were described as primarily good people who want to help mankind by finding critical 
security vulnerabilities in administration or business systems without abusing them 
and “to point out deplorable circumstances in politics” (Claus).Although noted by a 
lot of participants, none of them were in fear to be targeted by stakeholders, since they 
are more interested in media-effective targets.  
5 DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
The participants of this study were widely interested in how they can protect them-
selves. But, “the vulnerability of home computers is a security problem for many 
companies and individuals who are the victims of these crimes, even if their own 
computers are secure.” Within this study eight out of the eleven folk models were 
equal to those from the original study [8]. But additionally, three new folk models 
were discovered during the re-run of the study in Germany. Those models were “vi-
ruses are governmental software”, “hackers are governmental employees”, and “hack-
ers are stakeholders with individual opportunistic purposes”. It can be assumed, that 
those new models evolved due to the higher presence of the topic computer security 
in media during the last three years. For example, some well noticed events of the past 
few years were: governmental spyware, Wiki-leaks, Stuxnet (virus by a secret ser-
vice), changing Facebook privacy and the German ”Staatstrojaner”. This indicates 
that users are concerned with current developments in IT security and the associated 
risks. Additionally, the new models show that this concern leads to new ideas about 
threats and that it is possible to influence the ongoing folk model by accurate report-
ing in the media. This fact could be used to actively change the folk models on com-
puter security and thereby, not only promote more correct models but also promote 
appropriate countermeasures. Another source of those differences might be simple 
accounted for by the different cultural backgrounds in which the two studies were 
conducted. A good summary was mentioned by Politics & Policy: “[..] the E.U. gen-
erally allowing more rights to the individual. With no single law providing compre-
hensive treatment to the issue, America takes a more ad-hoc approach to data protec-
tion, often relying on a combination of public regulation, private self-regulation, and 
legislation.” [4] Also the ongoing discussion in Germany about privacy policies of 
Facebook and Google may play a bigger role in the way the participants described 
their mental models. Seeing it from a cultural point of view there might be additional 
folk models out of the U.S. and Europe. 
To develop the best possible security software it is necessary to consider those folk 
models to prevent misuse of it. The authors of this paper would suggest a two-step 
procedure: 1) Use media to arouse interest in computer security. In this step, it might 
be helpful to especially address those people who think that they do not need security 
software (e.g. people with the “hackers are professionals of criminal organizations” or 
“hackers are stakeholders” models) and inform about threats that might occur that are 
not person specific (e.g. botnets). 2). Design security software that emphasizes the 
potential dangers, gives action advices and supports self-reflection of security beha-
vior.  
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